

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2055

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 2406

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING

MARCH 15, 1974

SUMMARY: THE AD HOC GROUP MEETING ON 15 MARCH 1974,  
CHAired BY TURKISH REP TUREL DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING:

A) THE REPORT ON THE INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN  
REPS ON 14 MARCH; B) REPORT ON 13 MARCH US/USSR  
BILATERAL; C) DRAFT WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT OF  
21 MARCH, AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS. END SUMMARY

REPORT ON 14 MARCH INFORMAL MEETING

1. US AMBASSADOR (RESOR) STATED THAT THE WRITTEN  
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REPORT TO THE AHG ON THE INFORMAL SESSION OF MARCH 14,

1974 TEXT IN VIENNA 2320, 2345 COVERED ALL THE MAIN POINTS COVERED IN THAT SESSION. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT, WHILE THE CONVERSATION OSTENSIBLY DEALT WITH BOTH AIR AND NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO STRESS NUCLEAR MORE THAN AIR SYSTEMS. IN ADDITION, THEY APPEARED WILLING TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF DEFENSIVE PARITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN CENTRAL EUROPE IF ALL FORCE ELEMENTS WERE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF PARITY. THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF COMPUTING REDUCTIONS WAS ENTIRELY UNSATISFACTORY. THEIR APPROACH WOULD BE TO NEGOTIATE PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS FOR EACH SIDE. THEN EACH SIDE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SAYING WHAT THESE REDUCTIONS AMOUNTED TO. THE TOTAL OF FORCES WOULD NOT BE KNOWN IN ADVANCE. AFTER THE PERCENTAGES HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON AND THE REDUCTIONS COMPUTED, THE OTHER SIDE WOULD COMPUTE THE IMPLIED FORCES.

2. BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) SUPPORTED USREPS POINT ABOUT HEAVIER EASTERN EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS THAN AIR. HE BELIEVED THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE MOVING TOWARD USSR AND US REDUCTIONS FIRST, BUT MAKING THE POINT THAT THEY MUST INCLUDE AT LEAST A TOKEN REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR FORCES. BELGIAN REP COMMENTED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A DISTINCTION IN EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR FORCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET REP AND POLISH REP (STRULAK). THE SOVIET APPEARED TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS FOR APPEARANCE SAKE WHEREAS THE POLISH REP INTENSIVELY EMPHASIZED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANGLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PURSUED THE SUBJECT. SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE LESS INTRINSICALLY INTERESTED THAN POLES TO BE PLAYING A SUPPORTING ROLE ON SOLIDARITY GROUNDS. BELGIAN REP ADDED THAT IN A BILATERAL CONTACT WITH THE POLISH DEFORMIN IN WARSAW LAST WEEK, LATTER COMMENDED WITH ANNOYANCE THAT THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE THEN THE POLISH ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE.

3. FRG REP (HOFMANN) NOTED THAT IN PERSONAL  
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DISCUSSION WITH HIM AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV DEMONSTRATED A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BY REFERRING TO A TOTAL OF 16 PERSHING IN WEST GERMANY. HOWEVER, KHLESTOV DID SEEM TO BE INTERESTED IN THE SUBJECT OF "MININUCES" PROBABLY AS THE RESULT OF PRESS ARTICLES. FRG REP NOTED RECENT ARTICLE ABOUT ENTHOVEN'S RECOMMENDING THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN EUROPE FROM 7,000 TO 1,000. CZECH

AMBASSADOR (KLEIN) MAY HAVE REFERRED TO THIS ARTICLE IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE MARCH 14 INFORMAL SESSION WHEN HE SAID SOME AUTHORS RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

4. THE US REP OPENED THE DISCUSSION ON 13 MARCH US/USSR BILATERAL BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD PUSHED THEIR SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL WHILE THE US RESPONDED BY STATING FIRMLY THAT THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES. THE UK DEP REP STATED HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE WHOLE DISCUSSION HAD LED UP TO THE SOVIET QUESTION ABOUT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A FORCE FREEZE ON DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN-BETWEEN NEGOTIATING PHASES AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN MAIN THRUST OF SOVIET EFFORT. THE US REP RESPONDED THAT THE UK STATEMENT WAS SOMETHING OF AN OVER-STATEMENT. IN POINT OF FACT, THE SOVIET STATEMENT ABOUT A FORCE FREEZE HAD MAINLY REPRESENTED THEIR RESPONSE TO HIS OWN STATEMENTS ON THE NEED FOR US/ SOVIET ONLY REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, IT WAS INTERESTING IN TERMS OF THE SEQUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT OF DISCUSSIONS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE AFTER HE HAD FIRMLY REJECTED THEIR SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL.

5. THE GREEK REP ASKED IF THE OTHER SIDE HAD FURTHER DEFINED ITS CONCEPT OF A GLOBAL CEILING (SEE SEPTTEL, PARA 5). THE US REP STATED THAT THE DISCUSSION WAS RATHER STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CONCENTRATED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE US POSITION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS UNLESS THE WEST'S CONDITIONS WERE MET.  
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6. THE ITALIAN REP STATED THAT THE REPORT INDICATED (SEE SEPTTEL, PARA 5) THAT THE US REP HAD IDENTIFIED SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, NAMELY THE IDEA OF A GLOBAL CEILING, THE IDEA OF LIMITING THE ENTRY OF FORCES INTO THE AREA, AND PHASING. THE ITALIAN REP STATED HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN UP THEIR IDEAS ON PLACING NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS ON WESTERN FORCES. HE WONDERED HOWEVER IF THE SOVIETS HAD INDICATED FURTHER CONCESSIONS ON THE OTHER POINTS AT WHICH HE HAD JUST REFERRED. THE US REP STATED THAT THE DISCUSSION HAD NOT GONE INTO ANY DETAIL ON THESE POINTS. HOWEVER, IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT AS CONCERNED QUESTION OF

PHASING, THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THIS CONCEPT WHEN IT WAS TALKED ABOUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR PROPOSAL. BUT THEY REFUSED THUS FAR TO BE COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PHASING IN GENERAL. ONCE IT WAS APPLIED TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, THEY SEEMED TO LOSE INTEREST. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE WILLING TO TAKE THE RISK THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT FALL APART AFTER THEIR PROPOSAL FOR SYMBOLIC REDUCTION HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AND IMPLEMENTED. BUT THEY WERE UNWILLING TO RUN THE RISK THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT FALL APART AFTER THE WESTERN PHASE 1 REDUCTION PROPOSAL HAD BEEN ACCEPTED.

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R 182055Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2056

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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FROM US REP MBFR

7. THE ITALIAN REP SAID THAT THE SOVIET INTEREST IN A FORCE FREEZE IN-BETWEEN NEGOTIATION PHASES WAS AN INTERESTING ONE. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS THE SOVIETS MAY BE MORE INTERESTED

IN A COMMON CEILING IF THE WEST WOULD PROVIDE THEM WITH MORE DETAILS ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THE US REP REPLIED THAT THE STANDARD SOVIET RESPONSE SEEMS TO BE THAT THE WEST DOES NOT TELL THEM ENOUGH ABOUT PHASE II REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NOT INDICATED HOW MUCH MORE THEY WOULD NEED TO KNOW BEFORE THEY COULD COMMENT ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THE ITALIAN REP NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT EACH SIDE MIGHT DETERMINE ITS OWN APPORTIONMENT OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS BUT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT NOTION FOR PHASE II

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REDUCTIONS.

8. IN CLOSING THE DISCUSSION, THE US DEP REP REQUESTED THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE AHG TREAT THE REPORT CONFIDENTIALLY SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT EXPECT THE CONVERSATION TO BE DISCUSSED.

DRAFT WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT OF 21 MARCH

9. THE CHAIRMAN THEN TURNED TO THE DRAFT WESTERN STATEMENT WHICH WOULD REVIEW WESTERN ARGUMENTATION ON US/USSR GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. THOUGH THE DRAFT IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW IN VIENNA, MAIN POINT OF THE DISCUSSION WAS THE CANADIAN DEP REP STATEMENT THAT THE WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAD SO FAR STATED THAT THE FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR SHOULD NOT BE REDUCTED AT THE OUTSET OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. HE SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR CANADA'S OWN POSITION THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE NOT COMMITTED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES AT ANY TIME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

10. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY THE POLISH REP, THE BELGIAN REP ASKED THE AHG MEMBERS IF THEY COULD AGREE TO HOLD THE LAST PLENARY MEETING OF THIS SESSION ON TUESDAY, 9 APRIL, AND THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF THE NEXT SESSION ON 10 MAY. THE GROUP AGREED.

11. THE FRG DEP REP EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT THE EASTERN PRESS, EXPECIALLY PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA, HAD MOVED STILL FURTHER TOWARD CHARACTERIZING THE WESTERN MBFR POSITION IN "COLD WAR" LANGUAGE. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE SOVIET REP HAD MADE A NEW

EFFORT TO DENIGRATE THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION  
IN AN INFORMAL SOCIAL MEETING WITH WESTERN NEWSMEN  
IN VIENNA WHERE SOVIET REP HAD AVOIDED DIRECT  
STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE MEMBERS  
OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD SYSTEMATICALLY TAKEN  
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INDIVIDUAL WESTERN NEWSMEN ASIDE AND GIVEN THEM THE  
EASTERN LINE ABOUT REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS  
TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS. THE FRG DEP REP  
BELIEVED THAT THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD BE ALERT  
TO THE NEED FOR PRESENTING ITS OWN BACKGROUND  
BRIEFINGS IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN ORDER TO PUT ITS  
CASE ON THE PUBLIC RECORD.

12. THE CHAIRMAN SCHEDULED THE NEXT AD HOC  
GROUP MEETING FOR 18 MARCH. TRINKA

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
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